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A BUG IN THE BUGGING STATUTE
In this paper the author will analyze the reasoning of the
Whitaker holding and its ramifications with regard to the federal
procedures for authorized electronic eavesdropping as pre-
scribed in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Acts of 1968. The author concludes that the procedural
failing described by the Whitaker court can be corrected by
mandatory judicial controls and more stringent post-seizure
notification requirements.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TITLE III, OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL
AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF 1968' AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: United States v. Whitaker.
2
On June 17, 1970, a federal grand jury in Philadelphia issued an
indictment charging defendant Matthew F. Whitaker and a number of
other people with using interstate telephone facilities for the purpose of
gambling in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1970). Whitaker, along with
six other defendants (most of whom were not named in the first
indictment), was the subject of a second indictment on September 17,
1970, charging defendants with conspiracy to use telephone facilities for
the promotion of a gambling and bookmaking business, as well as other
substantive offenses (not included in the first indictment) in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2, § 371 and § 1952 (1970). During the course of its
investigation, and pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968,' the government instituted a wiretap of
defendant Whitaker's telephone. Prior to trial, the government notified
defendants that it intended to introduce recordings of wiretaps into
evidence,4 and defendants moved to suppress the contents of the
recordings and any other evidence derived from the wiretaps.5 Despite
a series of federal court decisions upholding the constitutionality of
Title I,6 the Whitaker court held the procedural safeguards of 18
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970).
2. 343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
3. In accordance with procedures set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970) for crimes specified
in 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1970).
4. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1970).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970).
6. United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 934 (1972).
In holding Title III to be constitutional, the court gave the following explanation:
As we view it, Congress was seeking to deal realistically with highly complex
problems in accordance with the demands of the Constitution. We are unable to
say that the product fails to satisfy the Constitution. Every effort has been made
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U.S.C. § 2518 inadequate under the fourth amendment, and therefore
declared Title III unconstitutional on its face.
7
As envisioned by Congress, Title III embodies a complex statutory
scheme intended to preserve reasonable judicial control over the
installation and maintenance of electronic surveillance. Under the Act, a
government officer, upon a showing of probable cause, may obtain an
ex parte order authorizing the interception of wire or oral communica-
tions for a period not to exceed 30 days. 8 The order must specify,
however, ".. . the period of time during which such interception is
authorized, including a statement as to whether or not the interceDtion
shall automatically terminate when the described communication has
been first obtained . . . . " In addition, the order must direct the
executing officers to minimize the scope and duration of surveil-
lance,' I and the issuing judge may require that periodic reports be
submitted ". . . showing what progress has been made.., and the need
for continued interception."' I
Title III also requires notice of the surveillance to be given to the
person named in the order within a reasonable time after the order has
been terminated or denied,"2 and also requires notification of the
surveillance to be given to parties against whom such evidence is to be
introduced in any trial, hearing or other proceeding.'
to comply with the requirements of Berger and Katz (citations omitted)....
In summary then, we uphold the statute on the basis that it demands an original
authorization in accordance with the mandate of Berger v. New York, supra, and
we do so upon the basis that the nature and probable consequences of authorized
wiretapping is discovery of unanticipated and undescribed communications.
The very nature of this form of invasion is conducive to producing unexpected
information. If wiretapping is to be validated, and Berger, Osborn and Katz
(citations omitted) recognize its validity, then the interception and use of infor-
mation which is so related to the original search is not to be excluded. In other
words, Congress has dealt with the problem about as well as could have been ex-
pected considering the nature and character of the subject matter and its con-
sequential incidents.
449 F.2d at 687. Accord, United States v. Focarlie, 340 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Md. 1972);
United States v. LaGorga, 336 F. Supp. 190 (W.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. King, 335
F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. Lawson, 334 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Pa. 1971);
United States v. Becker, 334 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); United States v. Perillo,
333 F. Supp. 914 (D. Del. 1971); United States v. Leta, 332 F. Supp. 1357 (M.D. Pa.
1971); United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971); United States v. Cantor,
328 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Fla.
1971); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom., United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1972).
7. Notice of appeal was filed by the government, June 28, 1972, in accordance with 18
U.S.C. § 2518(10)(b) (1970).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(e) (1970).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1970).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1970).
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In formulating this scheme, Congress relied heavily on the decisions
of the Supreme Court in Osborn v. United States,' Katz v. United
States,' and Berger v. New York.'6 In Osborn, a government
informer, acting pursuant to a court order, used a hidden tape recorder
to corroborate his testimony that he was solicited by the defendant in
an attempt to bribe a juror. The Court held that this recording did not
violate the defendant's rights under the fourth amendment, because the
use of this device, which was predicated upon ". . . a detailed factual
affidavit alleging the commission of a specific criminal offense . . ." was
"... for the narrow and particularized purpose of ascertaining the truth
of the affidavit's allegations. ' '
In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic listening and recording
device to the outside of public telephone booth from which the
defendant had placed frequent telephone calls. The agents confined
their surveillance to the brief periods during which the defendant used
the telephone booth, and they took great care to overhear only the
defendant's end of the conversations. While holding that the particular
search was in violation of the fourth amendment because of the lack of
a warrant, the Court stated that electronic surveillance could be
conducted in such a manner as to bring it within the allowable limits of
a reasonable search. The Court indicated that the method of conducting
the specific search in Katz would have been reasonable if a warrant had
been issued.' s But, clearly, the executing officer must not be left with
the discretion to execute such a search without restraints imposed by a
judicial officer.' '
In Berger, the Court confronted for the first time the questions of
electronic surveillance per se. The Court held the New York
14. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
15. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
16. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
17. 385 U.S. at 330.
18. 389 U.S. at 354:
Accepting this account of the Government's actions as accurate, it is clear that
this surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized magistrate,
properly notified of the need for such investigation, specifically informed of the
basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly apprised of the precise intrusion it
would entail, could constitutionally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards,
the very limited search and seizure that the Government asserts in fact took place.
19. Id. at 356-57:
It is apparent that the agents in this case acted with restraint. Yet the inescapable
fact is that this restraint was imposed by the agents themselves, not by a judicial
officer. They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their
estimate of probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate. . . . In
the absence of such safeguards, this Court has never sustained a search upon the
sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular
crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive means consist-
ent with that end. Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful
'notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,' for the Constitu-
tion requires 'that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer... be
interposed between the citizen and the police... '" (citation omitted).
[Vol. 2
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eavesdropping statute2 0 unconstitutional because it was "... too broad
in its sweep resulting in a trespassory intrusion into a constitutionally
protected area . . ."'1 Although the challenged statute permitted
electronic surveillance only after a warrant had been obtained, the
Court found numerous defects in its procedures: (1) a warrant could be
issued based on an affidavit which failed to meet the requirements of
"particularity" in describing the place to be searched,2 2 and the
conversations to be recorded; 2 3 (2) the surveillance was limited in
neither scope nor duration, thus allowing general searches; 2 1 (3)
termination of the surveillance was not required once the conversation
sought had been seized, thus placing excessive discretion in the hands of
the executing officers;2 ' and (4) the act failed to require a showing of
"special circumstances" sufficient to justify "secret" searches.2 6
DISCRETIONARY CONTROLS
Although Title III was designed to satisfy the commands of the
fourth amendment as explicated in Osborn, Katz, and Berger, the
20. N.Y. CODE OF CR. PROC. § 813-a (McKinney 1958):
§ 813-a. Ex parte order for interception, overhearing or recording
An ex parte order for the interception, overhearing or recording of telegraphic or
telephonic communications may be issued by any justice of the supreme court or
judge of a county court or of the court of general sessions of the county of New
York upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the attorney-general or of
an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police department of the state or of
any political subdivision thereof, that there is reasonable ground to believe that
evidence of crime may be thus obtained and identifying the particular telephone
number or telegraph line, and particularly describing the person or persons whose
communications are to be intercepted, overheard or recorded and the purpose
thereof. In connection with the issuance of such an order the justice or judge may
examine on oath the applicant and any other witness he may produce and shall
satisfy himself of the existence of reasonable grounds for the granting of such appli-
cation. Any such order shall be effective for the time specified therein but not for
a period of more than two months unless extended or renewed by the justice or
judge who signed and issued the original order upon satisfying himself that such
extension or renewal is in the public interest. Any such order together with the
papers upon which the application was based, shall be delivered to and retained
by the applicant as authority for intercepting, overhearing or recording or directing
the interception, overhearing or recording of the telegraphic or telephonic commu-
nications transmitted over the instrument or instruments described. A true copy
of such order shall at all times be retained in his possession by the judge or justice
issuing the same.
21. 388 U.S. at 44.
22. Id. at 55-56.
23. Id. at 58-59.
24. Id. at 59:
"[A juthorization of eavesdropping for a two-month period is the equivalent of a
series of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single showing of probable
cause." General searches have long been prohibited by the constitution. See Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
25. 388 U.S. at 59-60.
26. Id. at 60.
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Whitaker court held that Congress failed to achieve this goal.
Specifically, the court was concerned that under Title III the judicial
controls required by the fourth amendment were made discretionary
rather than mandatory, thereby leaving the potential for excessive
discretion in the hands of the executing officers. The court first turned
its attention to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(e) (1970) which provides that:
Each [ex parte] order authorizing or approving the intercep-
tion of any wire or oral communication shall specify-
(e) the period of time during which such interception is
authorized [up to 30 days], including a statement as to whether
or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the
described communication has been first obtained.
Although recognizing that this aspect of Title III ". . . is a significant
improvement from the New York Statute found unconstitutional in
Berger. , 2'7 the Whitaker court was nevertheless troubled by the fact
that, at the discretion of the issuing judge, the surveillance need not
terminate with interception of the described communication, but can
continue even after such interception for the period of time allowed in
the order. Whitaker held that this places too much discretion in the
hands of the executing officers. Moreover, the court found no solace in
the act's 30-day limit on interceptions. As Lord, C.J. stated:
Title III's intrusion is not 'precise' nor 'carefully circumscribed'
nor 'very limited'. The fact that it permits 30-day continuous
searches which are only half as long as those condemned in
Berger is a distinction without constitutional significance. This
aspect of Title III alone renders the Act unconstitutional.2
The Court found similar defects in 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1970), which
states that:
Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered
pursuant to this Chapter, the order may require reports to be
made to the judge who issued the order showing what progress
has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective
and the need for continued interception. Such reports shall be
made at such intervals as the judge may require.
As with 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (4)(e) (1970), the judicial controls
authorized by § 2518(6), are not mandatory. Thus, although the order
might be constitutional as applied, if the issuing judge exercises this
authority, his failure to do so leaves unduly broad discretion in the
27. 343 F. Supp. at 367.
28. Id. at 365-66.
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hands of the executing officers. Such a result, the court held, would
violate the fourth amendment's prohibition on general searches.
Finally, the Whitaker court held that the defects in § § 2518(4)(e)
and (6) could not be cured by § 2518(5), which provides in relevant
part that:
... Every order and extension thereof... shall be conducted in
such a way as to minimize the interception of communications
not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter.
Whitaker construed this section as requiring that a general direction
be inserted in every order instructing the executing officers to limit the
scope and duration of the surveillance as much as possible. Noting that
reliance upon such an instruction leaves the executing officer with the
difficult task of determining their relevance to the investigation, the
court concluded that a mere direction to use self-restraint ". . . is not a
constitutional substitute for specific pre-search controls imposed by a
judge."'2 9 It should be noted that Whitaker did not hold that the
issuing judge could have no discretion whatever. Rather, the court
feared that the impact of a judge's failure to impose any of the controls
would violate the fourth amendment.
The following situation illustrates the court's objections to the
judicial control aspect of Title III. An application is submitted to a
judge of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the procedures
prescribed in Title III, requesting an ex parte order for an electronic
surveillance not to exceed 30 days. The application further requests
that the order not be limited to a single conversation, but rather leave
open the authorization to intercept several communications relating to
the particular offense described in the application. In approving the
application and authorizing the ex parte order, the authorizing judge is
silent as to interim progress reports. The executing officers, in
accordance with the authorization of the ex parte order, have installed
surveillance devices at the authorized location, and, on the third day,
intercept a communication of the type described in the order. Since the
order does not require automatic termination upon the interception of
a communication of the type described in the authorization, the
executing officers continue the search for the remainder of the 30-day
period. Although no conversations of the type described in the order
are obtained after the first interception, a conversation relating to
criminal activities not described in the order is subsequently in-
intercepted. With the exception of the time involved, this hypothetical
case, lawful under Title III, parallels the objectionable situation
permitted under the New York statute which was held unconstitutional
in Berger.
29. Id. at 367-68.
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The fact that such a situation can arise while following the
procedures delineated in Title III led the Whitaker court to hold Title
III unconstitutional, on its face. The cases discussed below holding
Title III to be constitutional, on the other hand, draw no distinction
between discretionary and mandatory judicial controls. These courts
deemed the mere fact that such controls could be utilized by the issuing
judge to maintain judicial control to be sufficient to satisfy the
"reasonable search and seizure" requirement of the fourth amendment.
In the United States v. Escandar case3 0 for example, the court went
through a paragraph by paragraph analysis of § 2518 and concluded
that ". . . judicial control, which is necessary to any valid scheme under
the fourth amendment, is amply provided for in Title III."" Escandar
misconceives the problem: framed properly, the significant question is
not whether judicial controls are possible, but rather, whether they are
required.
This rather basic proposition may be demonstrated by an analogy to
the area of search warrants. Suppose Congress were to enact the
following statute:
In the absence of exigent circumstances, no federal law
enforcement officer shall conduct any search of any person or
place unless authorized by a warrant issued by a magistrate. A
magistrate may refuse to issue a warrant if the officer fails to
make a showing of probable cause.
As with Title III, the magistrate under our hypothetical statute has
discretion to exercise judicial control. Yet few would doubt that such a
statute, which purports to allow the magistrate to exercise his
discretion in such a way as to issue a warrant not based on probable
cause, would violate the fourth amendment.
Other courts, recognizing at least implicitly the need for greater
judicial control than that mandated by the Act, have strained to
construe Title III in such a way as to avoid constitutional difficulties. In
United States v. King,3 2 for example, the court upheld Title II at least
in part on the premise that the controls authorized in § 2518(6) are in
fact mandatory. 3 ' Such an interpretation, however, is contrary not
30. 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
31. Id. at 299. While it is true that the court in Escandar recognized the implications of valid
judicial control, it did not specifically deal with the question of whether the reasonable
search and seizure afforded by the fourth amendment necessitates mandatory judicial
control or is satisfied by discretionary judicial control.
32. 335 F. Supp. 523 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
33. Id. at 532. The court stated as one of its reasons for holding Title III to be constitutional
on its face the requirement that "frequent progress reports must be made to the author-
izing judge." It can be inferred from this language that the court presumed mandatory
judicial controls with regard to interim reports whereas the Whitaker court interpreted




only to the words of the statute, but also to explicit legislative
intent.3"
In United States v. Perillo,3" the court treated the 30-day
authorization on a single showing of probable cause as reasonable
because the judicial officer could limit the electronic intrusion to a
period of time less than the full 30-day maximum and because, as
construed by Perillo, the Act requires termination of the surveillance
... when the authorized objective has been accomplished.'"36
Similarly, the court in United States v. Leta,3" in upholding Title III,
reasoned that ". . . since a wiretap under Title III is to last no longer
than necessary 'to achieve the objective of the authorization', and in
any event no longer than 30 days without a new showing of presently
existing probable cause, the length of the search authorized by the
statute is reasonable." '3  What both of these cases failed to recognize is
that without required interim reports, these controls are more illusory
than real.3 9
34. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF
1967, S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 103-04 (1968). The majority report states:
Paragraph (6) sets out a procedure for periodic judicial supervision during a
period of surveillance.... It provides that when an order to intercept is entered
the order may require reports to be made to the judge who issued the order show-
ing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective
and the need for continued interception. The reports are intended as a check on
the continuing need to conduct the surveillance... .This provision will serve to
insure that it is not unthinkingly or automatically continued without due consider-
ation.
Although it is clear that this section is intended to provide a method of control over the
surveillance activities, in no way can it be read to command the authorizing judge to
require the filing of progress reports by the executing officers. It merely allows the issuing
judge, in his discretion, to require the filing of interim reports.
35. 333 F. Supp. 914 (D. Del. 1971).
36. Id. at 923. The court further stated:
The word "unreasonable" is certainly an ambiguous word; therefore, this Court
should be slow to upset the Congressional determination of what constitutes a
reasonable search and seizure as expressed in the terms of this statute in the ab-
sence of a strong conviction that the judgment of Congress was erroneous.
Id. at 919.
37. 332 F. Supp. 1357 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
38. Id. at 1360-61.
39. United States v. Scott, 331 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1971). While finding Title III to be
constitutional, the court granted the defendant's motion to suppress evidence gathered
through electronic surveillance because the executing officers failed to minimize the in-
trusion. In this case, the court held that the monitoring and recording of 100% of the
conversations on a 24-hour-a-day basis for the full duration authorized in the ex parte
order was, in this particular situation, unreasonable. The court recognized that there
might be some situations which necessitate the recording of 100% of the conversations
over a particular telephone, while in other situations this broad intrusion would be un-
reasonable. The burden of proof, however, rests with the government to show that the
executing officers attempted in good faith to minimize the intrusion, thus making the
search reasonable under the fourth amendment. But, in this case, no such showing was
made.
King tangentially treated this issue while discussing the constitutionality of Title III.
The court held that the Act was not unconstitutional on its face merely because the ex-
ecuting officers could abuse its provisions. Rather, the court assumed compliance with
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Finally, a rather unique argument propounded in Leta merits brief
attention. In upholding Title III's authorization of 24-hour-a-day
monitoring for up to 30 days, the Leta court suggested that such
continuous surveillance may be justified as a safeguard for the subject
of the interception. The reasons given for this unique point of view are
that a complete monitoring and recording of all of a subject's phone
conversations would insure that his conversations would not be edited
to his detriment, thus protecting his statements from being taken out of
context.4 0
POST-SEARCH NOTICE
Aside from the broad-discretion argument raised in the opinion, the
Whitaker court also held Title III to be in violation of the Constitution
in that ". . . it provides for unreasonable searches and seizures by not
requiring prompt notice after authorized surveillance has been
completed to those people whose conversations have been inter-
cepted."4 '
It has been held that the requirement for pre-search notice can be
legally waived in a situation where the disclosure would defeat the
purpose of the search.4 2 Title III requires a showing of such
circumstances in the application for the ex parte order,4 and requires
the requirement to minimize interceptions, stating: "On the assumption that surveilling
agents will comply with the mandate and devise appropriate means to effect minimiza-
tion, a general provision ... does not serve to invalidate the order." 335 F. Supp. at 538.
Such an assumption must be accepted if we are to view our system of law as a safeguard
of individual rights in a free society.
It is interesting to note that in the Scott case, the ex parte order required progress
reports to be submitted to the issuing judge every five days until the order expired. The
court pointed out that while this requirement was technically complied with, the re-
ports merely listed a log showing the time at which calls were intercepted, and a synop-
sis of those conversations relating to the particular type of crime described in the order.
The court reasoned that the judicial officer's power to terminate the search was nulli-
fied by the insufficiency of information to make such a determination.
40. 332 F. Supp. at 1360-61. Such statements fail to recognize that constitutional rights
cannot and must not be taken from individuals without their voluntary consent. Such a
decision rests in the people and is not abdicated to the government. The Leta court
further supported the constitutionality of Title III because it does not have many of the
other objectionable features of the New York statute in Berger, N.Y. CODE OF CR. PROC.
§ 813-a (McKinney 1958), and the maximum time for which a surveillance can be con-
ducted without a new showing of probable cause is only half as long as in the Berger case.
41. 343 F. Supp. at 368.
42. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37-41 (1963).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(18)(c) (1970):
Each application shall include the following information:
(c) a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be un-
likely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
Wiretap
the authorizing judge to make a determination that, to his satisfaction,
such circumstances do exist.4 '
The Whitaker court conceded that the purpose of electronic
surveillance would be nullified if the subject was cognizant of it. But
the failure to give prompt and adequate notice after the search has been
terminated violates both ". . . basic decency and the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ." ' embodied in the fourth
amendment.
In raising this objection, the Whitaker court directed its criticism to
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) and (9) (1970). These provisions outline the
disclosure procedures required under Title III. It is the contention of
the Whitaker court that these provisions, in effect, permit the
government to conduct secret searches which "... by definition reach
the outer limits of what is permissible . . . ,,4 under the fourth
amendment; but the failure to give prompt post-seizure notice of the
electronic surveillance to those persons whose conversations were
intercepted is ".... well beyond the bounds of the Constitution."'4
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(d) (1970) states:
Within a reasonable time but no later than ninety days after
the filing of an application for an order of approval under
§ 2518(7)(b) which is denied or the termination of the
period of an order or extensions thereof, the issuing or denying
judge shall cause to be served, on the persons named in the
order or the application, and such other parties to intercepted
communications as the judge may determine in his discretion
that is in the interest of justice, an inventory which shall include
notice of:
(1) the fact of the entry or the order of the application;
(2) the date of the entry and the period of authorized,
approved or disapproved interception, or the denial of the
application; and
(3) the fact that during the period wire or oral com-
munications were or were not intercepted.
The judge, upon filing of a motion, may in his discretion make
available to such person or his counsel for inspection such
portions of the intercepted communications, applications and
orders as the judge determines to be in the interest of justice.
On an ex parte showing of good cause to a judge of competent
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1970):
Upon such application the judge may enter an ex parte order.., if the judge de-
termines on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that-
(c) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reason-
ably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous;
45. 343 F. Supp. at 368.
46. Id. at 369.
47. Id.
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jurisdiction the serving of the inventory required by this
subsection may be postponed.
Not all persons whose conversations have been intercepted are
required to be given notice under this section. Only the person named
in the order is required to be given notice and this notice need not be
prompt. For example, notification can be delayed indefinitely, at a
judge's discretion, upon a showing that the investigation is still in
progress, even though the interception of communications of the person
named in the order has been terminated." In addition, the notification
when given requires only disclosure of the fact that an interception has
taken place, but does not require an inventory of the contents of the
seizure to be given.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1970) states:
The contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication
or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence
or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding
in a Federal or State court unless each party, not less than ten
days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has l1een furnished
with a copy of the court order, and accompanying application,
under which the interception was authorized or approved. This
ten-day period may be waived by the judge if he finds that it
was not possible to furnish the party with the above
information ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding
and that the party will not be prejudiced by the delay in
receiving such information.4"
Again, this section requires only notification of the search, but not
an inventory of the contents of the seizure. The notification is limited
to those parties against whom the contents are to be used, but does not
require notification to persons whose conversations have been
intercepted but who are not involved in the proceeding. Thus, if the
government intercepts communications and, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
48. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS ACT OF
1967, S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 105 (1968). The majority report states:
On an ex parte showing of good cause, the serving of the inventory may be, not
dispensed with, but postponed. For example, where interception is discontinued
at one location, when the subject moves, but is reestablished at the subject's new
location, or the investigation itself is still in progress, even though interception is
terminated at any one place, the inventory due at the first location could be post-
poned until the investigation is complete ... the intent of the provision is that
the principle of postuse notice will be retained.
49. Id.:
"Proceeding" is intended to include all adversary type hearings. It would include
a trial itself, a probation revocation proceeding, or a hearing on a motion for reduc-
tion of sentence. It would not include a grand jury hearing.
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§ 2517(1) (1970), 0 distributes the contents to other law enforcement
agencies, and these communications are not introduced in a proceeding,
no notice is required.
The Whitaker court held that these provisions violate "... a basic
right to know whenever the government has invaded an area in which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. . . .' ' Additionally,
the usefulness of these purported safeguards is destroyed when the
individual is notified of the search months and perhaps years after the
fact. "When the memory of the speaker or listener has long since
dimmed, it is difficult to see how.an effective challenge can be made to
the accuracy of a partially garbled recording or an assertion made that a
conversation was taken out of context by the government.""2 In
essence, the argument in Whitaker rests on the contention that
postseizure disclosure falls within the res gestae of the reasonable search
and seizure requirement of the fourth amendment. The failure to
remove the veil of secrecy after the search and seizure has been
terminated is certainly the kind of secret search prohibited by the
fourth amendment.
There is an overwhelming lack of judicial treatment of this point, and
understandably so. In conventional searches and seizures with a
warrant, the parties whose privacy is being invaded are made aware of
the intrusion by the physical presence of the executing officers.
Moreover, statutory requirements on both the federal and state levels
require the service of a copy of the warrant on the parties. In those
situations when the warrant is executed in their absence, a copy of the
warrant must remain on the premises.
Intentional attempts to conduct the search at a time when it is
known that the subject is not present have been held to be in violation
of the fourth amendment. A recent case, United States v. Gervato,5 "
held that such action by the executing officers ". . . was unreasonable
and unlawful and rendered the search and resulting seizures unreason-
able in violation of the fourth amendment. . ., and that... all
evidence procured as a result of that unlawful entry, search and seizure
must be ... rendered inadmissible in any criminal proceeding against
the defendant. . . ,,"" Noting that the fourth amendment ". . . not
only speaks of unreasonable searches and seizures, but also of '[tihe
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1) (1970):
Any investigative or law entorcement officer who, by any means authorized by
this chapter..., has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire or oral com-
munication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose such contents to another
investigative or law enforcement officer to the extent that such disclosure is ap-
propriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or
receiving the disclosure.
51. 343 F. Supp. at 369.
52. Id.
53. 340 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
54. Id. at 464.
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right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects...' ", ' Gervato held that "[t] here is a basic violation of our
traditional sensibilities in such a secret and ex parte procedure taking
place in a man's home, with him left to discover it for himself and
imagine what he will about its true purpose and procedure after-
wards." 5 6
Gervato used this strong language in a situation where the subject
became aware of the search shortly after it had taken place. Whitaker
argues that the fears created by not knowing if, in fact, a search has
been conducted or is presently being conducted is just as repugnant (if
not more),". . . considering a heritage which does not include secret
searches. ... "' ' Thus, although recognizing that electronic surveillance
must be conducted in secret, without pre-search notification, the
Whitaker court maintained that the Gervato decision commands
prompt post-seizure disclosure to all parties involved; failure to comply
with the requirement extends the surveillance beyond the scope
permissible under the fourth amendment.5 8
The federal statutory requirement for post-seizure disclosure in
conventional searches and seizures is contained in Rule 41(d)." 9 Similar




EXECUTION AND RETURN WITH INVENTORY. The
warrant may be executed and returned only within 10 days
after its date. The officer taking property under the warrant
shall give to the person from whom or from whose premises the
property was taken a copy of the warrant and a receipt for the
property taken or shall leave the copy and receipt at the place
from which the property was taken. The return shall be made
promptly and shall be accompanied by a written inventory of
any property taken. The inventory shall be made in the
presence of the applicant for the warrant and the person from
whose possession or premises the property was taken, if they
are present, or in the presence of at least one credible person
other than the applicant for the warrant or the person from
whose possession or premises the property was taken, and shall
be verified by the officer. The judge or commissioner shall upon
55. Id. at 462.
56. Id. The court went on to state;
Many if not most of us have in our homes something secret which we wish to re-
main secret, and which we think will injure or embarrass us if it becomes known. It
may not be illegal. Our fears regarding the effects of disclosure may be groundless.
But we still have the right not to come home to find our doors hanging open, and
the agents of the state come and gone from their search of our home, never know-
ing for sure where they searched or what they found. A man's home is still more his
castle than this.
57. 343 F. Supp. at 369.
58. Id.
59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d).
60. See N.J.S.A. 33: 1-61 (1937) and MD. R. P. 707§b.
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request deliver a copy of the inventory to the person from
whom or from whose premises the property was taken and to
the applicant for the warrant.
The cases, both federal 6 ' and state62 have held that if the search
warrant is valid and the entry lawful, the search is not rendered
unlawful by failure to leave a copy of a warrant or a receipt for the
property seized, since those duties are ministerial.
In Fitez v. State,6  the court reasoned that the purposes of such a
rule are: ".... (1) to allow the defense to prepare properly by
preventing surprise; (2) to identify the property admitted as in fact the
same property as that which was seized; and (3) to protect the property
owner's rights if his property should be returned to him."' 64 Unless
there is a showing that any of the above purposes was violated or that
there was actual prejudice to the defendant's case, the failure to comply
technically with the rule should not invalidate an otherwise reasonable
search and seizure.6 s
Whitaker argues, however, that these cases are not controlling with
regard to electronic surveillance. In each of these cases the court
pointed out that the defendant was present when the search was
conducted or was at least cognizant that it had taken place. Moreover,
upon request, the defendant could obtain both a copy of both the
warrant and the inventory. This does not hold true for searches and
seizures of conversations through electronic surveillance. Whitaker
therefore concludes that the purposes of Rule 41(d) are necessarily
violated and the defendant's case prejudiced by the inadequate
post-seizure disclosure requirements of Title III.
CONCLUSION
The Whitaker decision, if upheld, will compel Congress to reexamine
the constitutional requirements for conducting electronic surveillance
in a reasonable manner. 6 6 Like the courts in Berger and Katz, the
61. McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927); United States v. Haskins, 345 F.2d 111
(6th Cir. 1965); Evans v. United States, 242 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1957); United States v.
Klapholz, 17 F.R.D. 18 (1955), affd, 230 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1956); United States v. Har-
mon, 317 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Tenn. 1970); United States v. Hooper, 320 F. Supp. 507
(E.D. Tenn. 1969).
62. See Mills v. State, 12 Md. App. 449, 279 A.2d 473 (1971); Fitez v. State, 9 Md. App.
137, 262 A.2d 765 (1970); State v. Parsons, 83 N.J. Super. 430 (App. Div. 1964).
63. 9 Md. App. 137, 262 A.2d 765 (1970).
64. Id. at 142, 262 A.2d 768.
65. Id.
66. Since the procedures delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1970) are controlling in state pro-
ceedings under state electronic surveillance statutes, it will not be necessary for Mary-
land to amend its wiretapping sections to conform to any amended procedures required
by the Whitaker decision. 18 U.S.C. §2516(2) (1970) states in part:
The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attor-
ney of any political subdivision thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute
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Whitaker court did not find electronic surveillance to be a violation per
se of the fourth amendment; rather, the scope of the decision is limited
to the constitutional deficiencies of the procedural aspects embodied in
Title III.
To satisfy the requirements enunciated by the Whitaker court, the
judicial controls prescribed by Title III must be mandatory. Addi-
tionally, prompt and adequate post-seizure disclosure of the surveil-
lance, which is now discretionary, should be mandatory and should be
given to all parties whose conversations have been intercepted.
As was stated in United States v. United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division,6 7 "The Fourth
Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that
executive direction may be reasonably exercised." To facilitate such
judicial control, the judge authorizing or approving the request for
interception of wire or oral communications must require the executing
officers to file progress reports at specified intervals during the running
of the order. These reports must include, but not be exclusively limited
to, the following: (1) a statement as to what efforts are being made to
minimize the interception of conversations not subject to the
surveillance; (2) a log of all communications intercepted, showing the
time of the interception, the length of time it was monitored, and, if
possible, identifying the parties to the conversation; and (3) a statement
of that State to make application to a State court judge of competent jurisdiction
for an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communica-
tions, may apply to such judge for, and such judge may grant in conformity with
section 2518 of this chapter and with the applicable State statute an order author-
izing, or approving the interception of wire or oral communications..., when
such interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of the
offense of murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in
narcotic drugs, marihuana or other dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to
life, limb, or property, and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year,
designated in any applicable State statute authorizing such interception, or any
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses. (emphasis added)
Maryland now has in effect statutes dealing with the interception of communications,
MD. CODE ANN., art. 35 §§ 92-99 (Supp. 1971) and MD. CODE ANN., art. 27 § 125A-D
(Supp. 1971).
In State v. Siegel, 13 Md. App. 444, 285 A.2d 671 (1971), both Title III and the Mary-
land eavesdropping statutes were held constitutional. In so doing, the Siegel court
stated:
We conclude from the provisions referring to a state statute that all that is re-
quired for a state validly to permit interception of wire and oral communications is
to have in effect a statute authorizing its principal prosecuting attorney or the prin-
cipal prosecuting attorney of any of its subdivisions to apply to one of its judges of
competent jurisdiction for an order of interception. Without this authorization
any interception of communications by the State would be in violation of the fed-
eral act. With this authorization the federal act takes over and controls the state
action.... We construe the language of §2516(2) ... to mean that the state may
require procedures that are more restrictive than those spelled out in §2518 of the
federal act but in the absence of such statutory provisions the procedures are
pursuant to § 2518.
Id. at 460, 285 A.2d at 680.
67. 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
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as to the percentage of all calls occurring during the period that have
been recorded. Such reports will insure judicial supervision throughout
the period of authorization; they will provide the judicial officer with
information sufficient for him to determine whether there is presently
existing probable cause to continue the surveillance.
The order must automatically terminate upon the interception of a
single communication of the type described in the authorization. This
requirement will not preclude the possibility of continuing the
interception under a new authorization. The intercepted conversation
would, in most cases, be sufficient to establish a present showing of
probable cause for the issuance of a new ex parte order. But, by
requiring termination of the authorization at the first interception, the
determination as to whether the surveillance should be continued rests
with the judicial officer instead of with the executing officer.
These requirements would insure that the surveillance itself would be
conducted in a reasonable manner. Reasonableness is the ultimate
criterion of both the scope of the intrusion and the degree of judicial
control. As the scope increases, so necessarily must the controls become
more extensive. Since electronic surveillance is by its very nature a
broad invasion into a constitutionally protected area, greater judicial
supervision must be exercised so as not to intrude unreasonably into
this protected area of individual freedom. These requirements would
not obviate the purpose of the search: rather, they would insure the
legality of the government's actions.
Upon the termination of electronic surveillance of a particular
subject, prompt and complete post-seizure disclosure must be required.
Disclosure of the surveillance and the contents seized must be made to
all parties whose conversations have been intercepted. Notification
should be given by the issuing judge rather than by the executing
agencies. Such a requirement is in accord with Rule 41(d), as well as
similar state rules. It complies with judicial interpretation that the
fourth amendment serves to protect the privacy of the citizenry by
barring unreasonable searches and seizures wholly apart from any
question of potential incrimination.6" The notification must contain an
inventory of the contents of communications seized, along with copies
of the application and the authorization for the surveillance.
The argument that such post-seizure notification requirements would
hamper police investigations has no constitutional merit.6 Since this
proposed requirement would be effective only after the surveillance has
been terminated, the technical termination of the surveillance at one
location, caused by the subject's relocation, would not force disclosure
68. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484-85 (1965).
69. Similar arguments were raised before the passage of Title III. However, since its pas-
sage, I,887 orders have been approved out of the 1,889 applications submitted to judges
of competent jurisdiction. See Appendix p. 93 infra.
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at that time. Only when the surveillance of the person named in the
order has been terminated (including new authorizations based on new
showings of probable cause) will disclosure be required. But to permit
the government to withold notification of an electronic surveillance on
the pretext that an investigation is continuing involving someone not
named in the order clearly exceeds the permissible limits of the fourth
amendment. "We cannot forgive the requirements of the fourth
amendment in the name of law enforcement." 7 0 If this procedure is
permitted to continue, the logical extension is for conventional searches
and seizures to be conducted in secret and kept secret when possible.
As Whitaker recognized, "[i] f Berger and Katz were an invitation to
Congress to write a wiretapping statute that could pass constitutional
muster, we think that Congress unfortunately has exceeded the scope
of that invitation."'" The failure of the legislators to limit the use of
electronic eavesdropping devices properly. through statute has trans-
formed a potentially valuable law enforcement tool into nothing more
than an electronic fishing rod which the courts must condemn. But the
legislatures can cure these defects through corrective legislation which
would be compatible with both law enforcement needs and the
requirements of the constitution.
To facilitate these changes, it is suggested that 18 U.S.C. § 2518 be
amended in the following manner: (words in italics to be added, words
in brackets to be deleted, words in caps are new section to be added)
18 U.S.C. § 2518(5):
... Every order and extension thereof shall contain a
provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed
as soon as [practicable] possible, shall be conducted in such a
way as to [minimize] limit the interception [of communica-
tions not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter]
to only those communications related to the objective of the
surveillance, and must terminate upon the [attainment of the
authorized objective] interception of a conversation of the type
described in the order, or in any event in thirty days.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(6):
Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered
pursuant to this chapter, the order [may] must require reports
to be made to the judge who issued the order showing what
progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized
objective and the need for continued interception. Such reports
[shall be made at such intervals as the judge may require] must
be made every three days the order is operative.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(8) (d):
(d) Within a reasonable time but no later than ninety days
70. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967).
71. 343 F. Supp. at 369-70.
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after the filing of an application for an order of approval under
section 2518 (7) (b) which is denied or the termination of the
period of an order or extensions thereof, the issuing or denying
judge shall cause to be served, on the persons named in the
order or the application, and all other persons whose
conversations have been intercepted, an inventory which shall
include (notice of)--
... and;
(4) THE CONTENTS OF ALL INTERCEPTED CONVERSA-
TIONS. THE TERMINATION OF AN INTERCEPTION AT
ONE LOCATION CAUSED BY THE MOVEMENT OF THE
SUBJECT TO A NEW LOCATION WILL NOT FOR THE
PURPOSE OF THIS SECTION BE CONSIDERED A TERMI-
NATION IF THE INTERCEPTION IS TO BE CONTINUED
ON THE SUBJECT UNDER A NEW AUTHORIZATION AT
THE NEW LOCATION.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(9):
' .. This ten-day period may be waived by the judge (if he
finds that it was not possible to furnish the party with the
above information ten days before trial, hearing or proceeding)
only upon a showing of exigent circumstances and that the
party will not be prejudiced by the delay in receiving such
information.
APPENDIX
18 U.S.C. § 2519(3) (1970) requires that in April of each year, the
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
transmit to the Congress a full and complete report concerning the
number of applications for orders authorizing or approving the
interception of wire or oral communications and the number of the
orders and extensions granted or denied during the preceding calendar
year, together with other data required by law.
The first report was submitted to the Congress on April 30, 1969 and
covered the period June 20,.1968 to December 31, 1968. The second,
third and fourth reports, submitted April 30, 1970. April 30, 1971 and
April 30, 1972, respectively, covered calendar years 1969, 1970, and
1971.
Chart I, extracted from the above-mentioned reports, lists those
jurisdictions which have enacted electronic surveillance procedures
similar to Title III. Listed by year are the number of authorized
surveillances approved out of the number of applications submitted to
judges of competent jurisdiction.
During the report periods since the passage of Title III, there have
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TOTAL i74-174 301-303 596-596 816-816
which all but two were approved. This phenomenally high approval rate
clearly dispels police arguments that the current procedural require-
ments for an electronic surveillance are too restrictive.
There is a logical explanation for this high approval rate. All
applications for ex parte orders must have prior approval by the
Attorney General of the United States or his counterpart in state and
local jurdisdictions before submission to the courts. This screening
process would tend to eliminate those applications which fail to meet
the requirements for the issuance of authorizations by judges of
competent jurisdiction. The figures in the reports reflect only those
applications which have been submitted to judicial officers, but do not
include the requests denied by the head of the executing agencies.
The increased use of electronic surveillance is not necessarily
explained by the fact that more jurisdictions have enacted electronic
surveillance procedures. While it is true that the number of such
statutes has increased from 5 in 1968 to 20 in 1971, the bulk of the
increased use has occurred on the Federal level and in New Jersey and
New York, where organized crime task forces have been most active.
SNA
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